South Carolina Law Review
Volume 28

Issue 3

Article 5

Winter 12-1-1976

Criminal Law
Richard B. Watson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard B. Watson, Criminal Law, 28 S. C. L. Rev. 290 (1976).

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Watson: Criminal Law

CRIMINAL LAW
I.

ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE

The admissibility of evidence discovered in a warrantless
search of an automobile was at issue in State v. McTier.' The
defendant was convicted for possession of controlled substances.
On appeal the supreme court affirmed the defendant's conviction
finding no error in the lower court's ruling which admitted the
evidence seized in the warrantless search.'
McTier had been arrested for public intoxication in the parking lot of a drive-in restaurant while attempting to start his automobile. He was searched and taken to the police station. No
attempt was made at that time to search the vehicle. At the
station, while inventorying his possessions, police found a container of valium. Two police officers immediately returned without a search warrant to the drive-in restaurant where McTier's
automobile had been left. The automobile was taken to a nearby
garage and searched thoroughly. Varying quantities of controlled
medicinal drugs, as well as a quantity of marijuana, were discovered. The next morning, McTier was given Mirandawarnings and
questioned. At first, he denied possession of any drugs except the
valium. Later he confessed both to possession of controlled substances and to intent to sell.
On appeal, McTier challenged, inter alia, the admissibility
of the evidence seized from his automobile. Defendant's counsel
maintained that the officers should have obtained a search warrant, arguing that the holding in Preston v. United States3 does
not allow warrantless searches remote in time or place from the
arrest. The state attempted to justify the search and seizure of
the drugs from the automobile on the ground that the police
officers had a right, if not a duty, to inventory the automobile in
order to protect the arrestee's property.
The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected both of these
contentions and upheld the search on much simpler grounds,
affirming the holding of the trial judge:
"I hold that they could have arrested him, that this was a custodial arrest when they arrested the man and took him to the
1. 264 S.C. 475, 215 S.E.2d 908 (1975).
2. Id. at 486, 215 S.E.2d at 913.
3. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
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station; that when they saw this ampule of valium that they had
sufficient. probable cause then to go back and search his car
without a warrant; that only five minutes had elapsed from the
time they arrested him until the search of the car took place,
and that it was a proper search of the vehicle . . .,

The significance of this holding for future application is unclear in light of the requirements for searches and seizures imposed by the United States Constitution. The supreme court did
not deal directly with the fact that no search warrant was obtained. The lack of a search warrant, however, raises basic constitutional questions that might have been more thoroughly considered by the court.
The United States Supreme Court has long expressed a preference for search warrants.5 The purpose of the warrant is, of

course, to protect the public's Fourth Amendment right to be
secure from undue governmental intrusion by requiring that a
neutral and detached magistrate determine probable cause prior
to the search or seizure. The language of the Fourth Amendment
does not absolutely require a warrant in every instance of search
and seizure,' however, and certain limited exceptions to the warrant requirement have evolved. These exceptions apply to

searches incident to lawful arrest,' searches in hot pursuit,'
searches to prevent destruction of evidence,9 seizure of evidence
in plain view,'" searches upon consent," border searches,' 2 admin4. 264 S.C. at 483, 215 S.E.2d at 912.
5. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967): "searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions." The Fourth Amendment's right of privacy was made
enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). That case also specified the exclusionary rule
as the method of enforcement. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), further prescribed
the federal Fourth Amendment standards as applicable to the states. But see Stone v.
Powell,

-

U.S.

-,

96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976); note 28 infra.

6. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
7. United States v. Robinson, 414,U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969).
8.Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
9. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
10. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
11. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
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istrative or regulatory searches,' 3 and searches of an automobile
where its mobility makes the securing of a warrant impracticable.' 4 The basic requirement of the Fourth Amendment, however,
as set out by the Supreme Court, is that a warrant is generally
required for search or seizure. The exceptions are "jealously and
"15
,
carefully drawn .
For a warrantless search to be upheld, there must be a
"showing by those who seek exemption . . .[from the warrant
requirement] . . . that the exigencies of the situation made that
course imperative."'" Moreover, warrantless searches must nonetheless still be based on probable cause, as is the case with
searches made under a warrant.'7 Probable cause and exigent
circumstances, then, are both necessary conditions in order for a
warrantless search to be upheld under the Fourth Amendment.
In light of these dual requirements, the South Carolina Supreme
Court's holding,'8 that the police officers had probable cause to
search the car, is not enough to justify the conclusion that the
search was lawful. There were no exigent circumstances in this
situation and therefore no reason why a search warrant could not
have been obtained.
The supreme court attempted to buttress its decision by
noting" that its holding was "consistent with United States v.
Edwards,2" United States v. Robinson2 and Cady v. Dombrowski."" While its holding is superficially not inconsistent
with these three cases, none of them lend any constitutional supU.S. 543 (1968).
12. Almieda-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925); Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967).
13. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (search pursuant to municipal
housing code); United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973) (search of passengers in airport boarding area).
14. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925).
15. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
16. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
17. Although the language of the Fourth Amendment makes the probable cause
requirement only relevant to the issuance of warrants, it also protects the individual
against "unreasonable searches and seizures." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963), states that the requirements in an instance of warrantless search or seizure, "surely
cannot be less stringent." 371 U.S. at 479.
18. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
19. 264 S.C. at 484, 215 S.E.2d at 912 (citations omitted).
20. 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
21. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
22. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
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port to the warrantless search of McTier's automobile. Edwards
and Robinson were each concerned with a warrantless search of
a defendant's person and effects incident to a lawful arrest.s
Cady v. Dombrowski was a narrow holding involving a unique
which should not be applicable to the McTier
fact situation
24
search.
While the South Carolina Supreme Court made no mention
of it in its opinion, it is worth nothing that the so-called "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement is not applicable to
justify the McTier search. That exception, first enunciated in
Carroll v. United States,25 has been given its latest expression in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire." The Coolidge majority held that
23. In Edwards, the United States Supreme Court addressed specifically the warrantless search of a defendant's person and effects after he had been taken into custodial
arrest. No search of an automobile was involved. The Court concluded that
once the accused is lawfully arrested and is in custody, the effects in his possession at the place of detention that were subject to search at the time and place
of his arrest may lawfully be searched and seized without a warrant even though
a substantial period of time has elapsed between the arrest and subsequent
administrative processing, on the one hand, and the taking of the property for
use as evidence, on the other.
415 U.S.at 807. Edwards, while justifying the inventory at the police station, cannot
justify the subsequent warrantless search of McTier's automobile, unless the South Carolina court is extending the meaning of "effects in his possession" to include the car which
he is driving at the time of his arrest. Edwards involved the search and seizure of paint
chips from a defendant's clothing subsequent to his arrest. To extend the rationale of
that case so as to make McTier's automobile an "effect in his possession" at the time of
arrest would stretch the meanings of these words beyond their normal usage.
Robinson likewise addresses only the search of a person incident to his lawful arrest.
It extended the rationale of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), which had limited
a warrantless search of the person incident to a lawful arrest to a search for weapons or a
search for evidence which otherwise might be concealed or destroyed. 395 U.S. at 763.
Robinson, however, allows the police to make the search incident to lawful arrest regardless of the particular circumstances of that arrest. 414 U.S. at 235. Robinson is concerned
solely with a search of the person. It in no way justifies the search of McTier's automobile
at a time subsequent to his arrest.
24. Cady involved the warrantless search of the trunk of a car which had been towed
to a service station following an automobile accident. The driver had been injured and
was in a coma. Since he was known to be a Chicago policeman, and therefore was required
to carry a service revolver at all times, police made a caretaking search for the gun to
prevent it from being stolen by vandals. During this search, they discovered evidence of
an unreported murder. The Supreme Court held the search to be a lawful custodial search
on the unique facts of the case. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
25. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
26. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The Coolidge decision settled the confusion that existed
among lower courts for a while after the decision in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970). Chambers held that when the driver of an automobile is stopped upon probable
cause, an immediate warrantless search of the vehicle is permissible because "the opportunity to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable." 399 U.S. at 51. Confusion
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any search, to be justified under the automobile exception, must
be made both upon probable cause and under "exigent circumstances.""7 Presumably, such an exigent circumstance would exist
where an automobile, for which there was probable cause to
search, might be driven away before a warrant could be obtained.
In the McTier situation there was no exigent circumstance
to justify a warrantless search. McTier was in custody. The State
offered no practical reasons for not waiting to secure a warrant.
Therefore, the warrantless search seems suspect in light of the
Fourth Amendment, and the evidence thus obtained should
likely have been excluded at trial if the federal standard were
strictly applied.28
I.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

In Thomas v. Leeke,29 the United States District Court was
faced with a petition for habeas corpus relief from a conviction
and incarceration for robbery." The question before the court was
whether evidence of a witnesses' jailhouse voice identification of
Thomas, during the latter's incarceration for another crime, was
admissible as evidence.
A police lieutenant had received a telephone call for an informant, Key, disclosing that Key and defendant Thomas had
robbed a Handy Pantry food store. Later the two defendants were
arrested under a warrant charging them with another robbery.
After the defendant had been jailed, Walters, a witness to the
Handy Pantry robbery, was summoned by the police to identify
one of the robbery suspects. Walters was then led to Thomas' cell
where he proceeded to make a voice identification of Thomas as
one of the Handy Pantry robbers; Thomas was alone in his cell
existed because this language was difficult to reconcile with the facts of the case. At the
time the car was searched, the defendants were under arrest and the car was in police
custody. This would seem to present the police with something more than a "fleeting"
opportunity to search.
27. 403 U.S. at 478, 479. The opinion of the Court was a plurality opinion. Mr. Justice
Harlan created a majority, however, when he joined the Court in Part II-D which required
a showing of exigent circumstances in order to justify a warrantless search.
28. In a decision made subsequent to McTier the United States Supreme Court
significantly limited the application of the exclusionary rule in a case where a Fourth
Amendment violation was alleged in a habeas corpus proceeding. The Court seems to
suggest that, in some Fourth Amendment cases at least, strict exclusion of tainted evi96 S.Ct. 3037 (1976).
U.S. -,
dence is not mandatory. Stone v. Powell, 29. 393 F. Supp. 282 (D.S.C. 1975).
30. Id. at 283.
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at the time of this identification. At trial, Walters testified to this
earlier voice identification. Upon this testimony and other evidence,3' Thomas was convicted of the robbery.

In United States v. Wade,32 the United States Supreme
Court held that a line-up or other type of pre-trial identification
was a "critical stage" in the prosecution of a defendant. As such,
"[tihe principle of Powell v. Alabama and succeeding cases requires that we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused
to determine whether the presence of his counsel is necessary to
preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial ....

."3

The Court went on to hold that the line-up identification
procedure (and by implication other identification procedures
with a potential for bias) required the presence of counsel under
3
The United States Supreme Court had
the Sixth Amendment4.

not made clear, however, whether this right to counsel existed
merely for the post-indictment identification procedures challenged in Wade, or whether it extended also to pre-indictment,
pre-trial identifications.
In 1972, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve some of this
uncertainty in Kirby v. Illinois. 35 The plurality opinion of that

case made it clear that the "right to counsel attaches only at or
after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against [the defendant]." 3 The commencement of adversary judicial proceedings might be by formal charge, preliminary
hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.3 7 The Court
went on to hold that defendant Kirby, who had been picked up
in a "routine police investigation," had not become the subject
of such adversary judicial proceedings.3 1 Other than the five situations cited above, the Supreme Court gave no general guidance
31. Among the evidence submitted to the jury was the in-court identification of
another witness, Mrs. Kiker. Since she had not been called on to make any kind of pretrial identification, and had not seen Thomas between the robbery and the trial, the
district court found her in-court identification to be untainted by any illegal pre-trial
confrontation. Had the prosecution merely relied upon an in-court identification by Walters without having had him testify as to his earlier jailhous identification, the burden
would have been upon the defense to show any illegal confrontation prior to trial.
32. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
33. 388 U.S. at 227 (citation omitted).
34. Id. at 237.
35. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
36. Id. at 688.
37. Id. at 689.
38. Id. at 690.
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as to when adversary proceedings should be considered to have
begun.
The district court, in a decision that seems to contradict
Kirby, held for the first time that the pre-trial, pre-charge identification of Thomas was one requiring counsel.39 Since Walters'
voice identification of Thomas was made in the absence of
Thomas' counsel it was inadmissible. The district court looked to
an earlier United States Supreme Court Sixth Amendment case
to find a standard to determine at what point in time adversary
proceedings may be considered to have been initiated. In United
States v. Marion,4" which was decided in 1971 prior to Kirby, the
United States Supreme Court dealt not with the right to assistance of counsel, but rather with the right to a speedy trial. In
that context, the Court held that the right to a speedy trial attaches as soon as the defendant is formally accused, whether by
indictment, arraignment, or arrest and holding. 41 The Thomas
court reasoned that the term "criminal prosecution" in the Sixth
Amendment could not mean one thing for the right to a speedy
trial and another thing for the right to assistance of counsel. 2
When Walters was summoned to the jail for the purpose of identifying the Handy Pantry robbers, Key and Thomas became the
subjects of prosecution for that crime. The district court distinguished the instant fact situation from that of Kirby on the following grounds: Suspect Kirby had to be identified or released.
Thomas was to remain in custody regardless of when the identification procedure took place since he was already being held on
another charge. Consequently there was no urgency to expedite
formal proceedings against him on this charge. As the court
stated: "It would be a hollow Sixth Amendment right if the police
could avoid the presence of counsel merely by postponing the
approval of a disinterested magistrate for an already legal ar39. 393 F. Supp. at 286.
40. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
41. The court stated:
[1It
is readily understandable that it is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a
criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment.
Invocation of the speedy trial provision thus need not await indictment,
information, or other formal charge.
404 U.S. at 320, 321.
42. 393 F. Supp. at 285. However, Marion was not referred to by the United States
Supreme Court in the Kirby decision.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

7

1976]

South Carolina Law
Review, Vol.
28, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 5
CRIMINAL
LAW

rest. ' 43 However, the "already legal arrest" was for a separate
crime. To meet this objection the Thomas court cites Saltys v.
Adams," a Second Circuit decision, for the proposition that it
matters not, for purposes of a "critical stage" question, that the
suspect was under arrest for a crime other than the one in question.
While it is true that Kirby was a plurality opinion, that left
many unanswered questions, and hard to reconcile with Wade, it
is difficult to read Kirby as requiring the right to counsel for
defendant Thomas. The similarities between the Thomas fact
situation and that of Kirby are striking. In both situations, the
suspect was under arrest. In neither had the suspect been formally charged with any crime. The only significant distinction
between the two cases is that Thomas was also under arrest for
another unrelated offense at the time of the identification. If the
right to counsel did not attach to Kirby, it seems doubtful that
it ought to attach to Thomas. No other federal court has read
Kirby in the light of Marion. By doing so, it would seem that the
district court has substituted a standard not intended by the
United States Supreme Court for determining when the right to
counsel attaches. Since the Supreme Court had already decided
Marion when it was considering Kirby, it could have used the
Marion standard in Kirby had it so desired.
The district court did not have to sustain the Sixth Amendment line of attack in order to invalidate the pre-trial identification by Walters. Indeed, it went on to find the identification
procedure itself to be "so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive
to irreparable mistaken identification as to be a denial of due
process"45 under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
court noted the suggestiveness of an identification made immediately after Walters was told he was going to be shown one of the
robbers for identification. Furthermore, it observed that unnecessary prejudice resulted from the making of an identification in a
one-on-one situation when there was no reason not to use a line43. Id. at 286.
44. 465 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1972). Saltys was decided after Kirby. The Thomas court
notes that the Saltys opinion is consistent with the Supreme Court decision in Mathis v.
United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), "which held that for purposes of safeguarding Fifth
Amendment rights, it makes no difference that the person questioned is in custody for
another crime." 393 F. Supp. at 286.
45. Id. at 287, citing Foster v. California, 394 U.S 440, 442 (1969), quoting from
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
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up procedure. In invalidating the identification on the latter due
process grounds, the district court is on firm footing following a
solid line of Fourth Circuit decisions." However, its treatment of
the pre-trial, pre-charge identification as one requiring the assistance of counsel involves an unnecessary venture into tenuous
reasoning.
III.

ADVERSE PRE-TRAL PUBLICITY

The common law rule in South Carolina has long been that
a motion for change of venue or a continuance in a criminal case
due to adverse pre-trial publicity or community prejudice is
granted at the discretion of the trial judge. On appellate review
of such a ruling, the South Carolina Supreme Court will not
overturn the trial court's ruling absent a showing of abuse of
discretion."7 The court has overruled a trial judge for abuse of
discretion on very few occasions."
State v. Valenti" presented facts which seemed clearly to
show abuse of discretion by the trial court, however, the supreme
court failed to so find.
Richard Valenti was arrested for assault with intent to rav5
ish." During a recorded oral confession, 5 ' Valenti referred to other
crimes, and in so doing admitted to the abduction and strangulation of two teenaged girls in an incident unrelated to that for
which he was arrested. 2 Valenti agreed to take the police officers
to the bodies. Accompanied by television photographers, 3 he led
the police to a location on Folly Beach. While being photographed
by television cameras, he pointed out the shallow grave where he
46. See, e.g., Stanley v. Cox, 486 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1973); Smith v. Coiner, 473 F.2d
877 (4th Cir. 1973); Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966).
47. State v. Crowe, 258 S.C. 258, 188 S.E.2d 379, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972);
State v. Tilman, 255 S.C. 528, 180 S.E.2d 209 (1971); State v. Swilling, 249 S.C. 541, 155
S.E.2d 607 (1967); State v. Fuller, 227 S.C. 128, 87 S.E.2d 287 (1955); State v. Gantt, 223
S.C. 431, 76 S.E.2d 674 (1953); State v. Francis, 152 S.C. 17, 149 S.E. 348 (1929); State
v. Goodwin, 127 S.C. 107, 120 S.E. 496 (1923); State v. Coleman, 8 S.C. 237 (1876).
48. But see State v. Davis, 138 S.C. 532, 137 S.E. 139 (1927); State v. Sullivan, 39
S.C. 400, 18 S.E. 865 (1893). The South Carolina Supreme Court tends to uphold the
decision of a trial judge granting a change of venue and will even uphold a change of venue
beyond the circuit. See State v. Law, 265 S.C. 111, 217 S.E.2d 22 (1975).
49. 265 S.C. 380, 218 S.E.2d 726 (1975).
50. Id. at 383, 218 S.E.2d at 727.
51. The admissability of fruit from the confessions and admissions was also unsuccessfully challenged in this case. Id. at 387, 218 S.E.2d at 728.
52. Id. at 384, 218 S.E.2d at 727.
53. Brief for Appellant at 4.
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had buried the girls. 4 The discovery of the bodies dominated local
news reports for several days. Two stations reported it in their
normal newscasts and one station issued special bulletins as
events unfolded. 5 Interviews with the families of the deceased
girls were broadcast. Additionally, the Charleston newspapers
carried headline stories on the confession and discovery of the
bodies."
The voir dire examination of the jury revealed that all members of the jury had, to a greater or lesser extent, followed the
events on television or in the local newspapers.57 A pre-trial motion for change of venue, or, in the alternative for a continuance,
was denied. Valenti was tried for the murder of both girls and
was found guilty on both counts. He was sentenced to two consecutive life terms in prison.
On appeal the South Carolina Supreme Court found no error
in the trial court's denial of change of venue or continuance. The
court based its decision on the South Carolina case of State v.
Crowe.5 In Crowe the court held that when the jurors "stated
under oath that they were not biased or prejudiced and could give
the defendant a fair and impartial trial . . .the claimed prejuId.
Record at 27-40.
Id.
Record, Jury Voir Dire, at 168.
A motion for a change of venue may be made under S.C. CONST. art. 5, § 19 and
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-458 (1962). S.C. CONST. art. 5, § 19 states:
It shall be the duty of the General Assembly to pass laws for the change of venue
in all cases, civil and criminal, upon proper showing, supported by affidavit,
that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county where such action or
prosecution was commenced. The State shall have the same right to move for a
change of venue that a defendant has for such offenses as the General Assembly
may prescribe.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-458 (1962) states in part:
The circuit courts shall have power to change the venue in all criminal cases
pending therein, and over which they have original jurisdiction, by ordering the
record to be removed to another county in the same circuit. The application for
removal must be made to the judge sitting in regular term by some party interested, by the solicitor of the circuit or by the accused, supported by affidavit
that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county where such action or
prosecution was commenced.
59. 258 S.C. 258, 188 S.E.2d 379, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972). Crowe had been
involved in a felony-murder at a poker game in Laurens. The extent of the pre-trial
publicity was eight or ten newspaper articles published in the Laurens Advertiser and the
GreenvilleNews. Record at 4, State v. Crowe. This would seem to be a substantially lesser
degree of publicity involving subject matter less scandalous and shocking than the Valenti
sex murder.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
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dice from newspaper publicity and discussions of the case in the
community was not established."" ° But this scarcely seems to
offer a reliable test for prejudice to a defendant. As was pointed
out by counsel for the defendant in Valenti,"' the United States
Supreme Court has recognized, in Marshall v. United States,"
that jurors, when asked a general, conclusory question about their
ability to be fair, will generally answer in the affirmative. The
Supreme Court indicated that such an answer was not dispositive
of the issue, was not binding upon the appellate court, and should
not bind the trial court.63 In Valenti the South Carolina Supreme
Court essentially ignored Marshall, affirming the trial court on
the insubstantial basis of the jurors' answers to the voir dire.
Any decision to grant a change of venue must, of course,
involve a balancing of two of the requirements of the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury." The first is that a criminal
trial be made by an impartial jury. The other is that such jury
be from "the state and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed." 5 A trial conducted in an atmosphere of adverse
publicity may violate the Sixth Amendment in that a defendant
is tried by a jury that has been influenced by exposure to evidence
which would not be admissable at trial.
While the Valenti opinion suggests that the voir dire
examination is sufficient to screen jurors for prejudice, the United
States Supreme Court has indicated the opposite in a case in
which there had been excessive pre-trial publicity. In Rideau v.
Louisiana6 the United States Supreme Court found extreme pre60. 258 S.C. at 266, 188 S.E.2d at 383.
61. Brief for Appellant at 6.
62. 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
63. Id. at 312. Although the South Carolina Supreme Court did not distinguish
Marshall, it might have answered the argument of defendant's counsel by finding that the
United States Supreme Court was merely exercising its supervisory power to formulate
and apply proper standards for federal criminal justice. Thus, it is not necessary to read
Marshall as a constitutional mandate. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957);
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
64. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) stands for the proosition that each
element of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial applies to the states to the same extent
that it applies to the federal government, due to incorporation through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) and Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
356 (1972) reaffirm this view. Even prior to these cases the United States Supreme Court
had struck down state convictions solely on the ground of prejudicial pre-trial publicity.
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
65. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
66. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
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trial publicity to be inherently prejudicial, regardless of the results of the voir dire examination of the jury. Two months prior
to Rideau's trial and some two weeks before his arraignment for
robbery, kidnapping and murder, a local TV station broadcast on
three occasions a 20-minute "interview" with Rideau. During this
"interview," Rideau, who was flanked by policemen, admitted to
the various offenses, with which he was later charged, in response
to leading questions by the sheriff. Prior to the trial, his appointed counsel moved for a change of venue. This was denied.
Rideau was convicted of murder and kidnapping, and was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court reversed:
For anyone who has ever watched television the conclusion
cannot be avoided that this spectacle, to the tens of thousands
of people who saw and heard it, in a very real sense was Rideau's
trial-at which he pleaded guilty to murder. Any subsequent
court proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed to
such a spectacle could be but a hollow formality .... [W]e do
not hesitate to hold, without pausing to examine a particularized transcript of the voir dire examination of the members of
the jury, that due process of law in this case required a trial
before a jury drawn from a community of people who had not
seen and heard Rideau's televised "interview.""7
Under Rideau, then, the appellate court's first inquiry in a
case of this nature must be whether there was excessive pre-trial
publicity. If such excessive pre-trial publicity existed the results
of the voir dire examination are irrelevant. A change of venue is
mandatory. The South Carolina Supreme Court should have
made this inquiry first in reviewing the Valenti trial. If the supreme court had found excessive publicity after applying the federal standard, then, regardless of the results of the voir dire, the
court should have remanded the case with instructions for a
retrial in a new venue6s
67. Id. at 726-27.
68. It can be easily argued that Valenti was prejudiced at least to the same extent as
was Rideau. Only three of Rideau's jurors stated that they had seen the television broadcast. All of Valenti's jurors had followed the case, either in the newspapers or on television.
Rideau made an oral confession to a law officer on television. Valenti was pictured on
television pointing out the grave sites to a policeman. This would be the equivalent of a
televised confession. In addition, up-to-the-minute bulletins on the discovery of the bodies
kept the "confession" alive in the mind of the public. If Valenti were less prejudiced than
Rideau, the degree would seem insubstantial.
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POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

The South Carolina Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure
Act, " provides in part that a person convicted of, or sentenced for,
a crime may apply for post-conviction relief if he claims
(1) [t]hat the conviction or the sentence was in violation
of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or
laws of this State;
S. ..

or

(6) [tlhat the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject
to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory or other writ,
motion, petition, proceeding or remedy. .... 70
However, the act goes on to say that "[t]his remedy is not a
substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or of direct review of the sentence or
conviction."'
Post-conviction relief differs from a direct appeal in that it
is a collateral attack upon a conviction, usually made by a prisoner after imprisonment. In such an appeal a prisoner is assert69. S.C. CODE

ANN. §§

17-601 to -612 (Cum. Supp. 1975).

70. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-601 (Cum. Supp. 1975). This entire section reads as follows:

(a) Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime and
who claims:
(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this State;
(2) That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence;
(3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law;
(4) That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the
interest of justice;
(5) That his sentence has expired, his probation, parole or conditional
release unlawfully revoked, or he is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other
restraint; or
(6) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral
attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore available under any common
law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding or remedy; may institute, without paying a filing fee, a proceeding under this chapter to secure relief.
Provided, however, that this section shall not be construed to permit collateral
attack on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction.
(b) This remedy is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or of direct review of the sentence or
conviction. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, it comprehends and
takes the place of all other common law, statutory or other remedies heretofore
available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence. It shall be
used exclusively in place of them.
71. Id. (emphasis added).
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ing, in effect, that he has been unlawfully incarcerated. The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is a statutory enactment of
the common law procedure for the writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum, a procedure which has been historically available
to prisoners to challenge an alleged illegal imprisonment both
prior to and after conviction.
Since this remedy may not be used as a substitute for direct
appeal, post-conviction relief seems to be unavailable to an applicant who failed to file proper notice of intent to appeal within the
statutory 10-day period subsequent to his conviction and sentencing. 72 A strict construction of this "no substitute" provision could

operate harshly upon an applicant for post-conviction relief who,
through no fault of his own, had not made a direct appeal of his
conviction. In Simmons v. State,73 the South Carolina Supreme
Court dealt with the application of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act in a situation in which a criminal defendant had failed
to appeal a conviction but had later applied for post-conviction
relief on the grounds that a constitutional right had been violated
at trial.
Simmons was serving a life sentence. for homicide by the
reckless operation of a motor vehicle. After Simmons' conviction,
a second attorney had been engaged, specifically for the purpose
of perfecting and presenting an appeal. 7 Because of inadvertence,
however, notice of intent to appeal was not filed within the 10day period required by §7-405. The attorney during this time was
72. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-405 provides in pertinent part:

In every appeal to the Supreme Court from an order, decree or judgment granted
or rendered at chambers from which an appeal may be taken to the Supreme

Court, the appellant or his attorney shall, within ten days after receiving written
notice that the order has been granted or the decree or judgment rendered, give

notice to the opposite party or his attorney of his intention to appeal; and in all
other appeals to the Supreme Court, the appellant or his attorney shall, within
ten days after the rising of the circuit court, give like notice of his intention to

appeal to the opposite party or his attorney ...
S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-410 (1962) is the only provision permitting time extensions in the

appeals procedure. It does not provide an extension of the time requirements for noting
an appeal:

The time for taking any step or proceeding in the preation and perfection of an
appeal from a circuit court to the Supreme Court, as now prescribed by law,
except the time ofgiving notice of appeal to the oppositeparty, may be extended
by the judge who heard the cause or by any one of the justices of the Supreme
Court, upon four days' notice of such motion being first given to the opposite
party. (emphasis added).
73. 264 S.C. 417, 215 S.E.2d 883 (1975).
74. Record at 1; id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol28/iss3/5

14

Watson: Criminal Law

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEw

[Vol. 28

pre-occupied with an election campaign as well as with a personal
illness.' 5 This second attorney died, and a third attorney was
engaged. He filed an application for post-conviction relief 6 based
in part upon contentions that Simmons was prejudiced both by
a rebuke of trial counsel made by the trial judge and by a comment made by the solicitor upon failure of Simmons' wife to
testify when she was in fact unavailable. Both of these grounds
would seem to be appropriate bases for an application for postconviction relief since they directed affect the fairness of the trial
and are thus arguably due process questions under the Fourteenth Amendment. Alternatively they would fall under the sixth
provision of the Act (set out above) as allegations of trial error
under common law.
The circuit court denied the application77 and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that these two grounds
were "matters proper for this Court's consideration [only] upon
[a direct] appeal. It is uniformly held that an application for
post-conviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal."78 The
court did not consider the fact that the failure to appeal in a
timely fashion was no fault of Simmons but was, in fact, the
result of attorney inadvertance. Justice Ness, in a strong dissenting opinion, found merit in both bases for post-conviction relief. 9
He did not, however, address specifically the hurdle imposed by
the clear statutory language of § 17-601 which states that "[tihis
remedy is not a substitute for . . . direct review of the sentence
or conviction."80
Simmons is not the first instance in which the South Carolina Supreme Court has considered whether an application for
post-conviction relief based upon constitutional grounds was proper in a situation where the defendant had not directly appealed.
1 held that relief
The court, in the 1974 case of White v. State,"
75. Id.
76. Id. at 10-11.
77. The circuit court's denial appears to be based primarily on the merits rather than
upon any conclusion that § 17-601 precluded any consideration of the application.
78. 264 S.C. at 423, 215 S.E.2d at 885.
79. 264 S.C. at 424, 215 S.E.2d at 886. Justice Ness concluded from a review of the
entire proceedings that the alleged errors separately and in combination mandated, in the
absence of proof of express malice, a finding that the conviction for murder and the
sentence of life imprisonment violated the defendant's due process rights.
80. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-601 (Cum. Supp. 1975).

81. 263 S.C. 110, 208 S.E.2d 35 (1974). For a discussion of White and its potential
effect on federal habeas corpus applications, see CriminalLaw, 1974 Survey of S.C. Law,
27 S.C.L. Ray. 363, 380 (1975).
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was inappropriate under this statute for a defendant who had not
brought a prior direct appeal of his conviction and who consequently did not appeal his sentence. Defendant White alleged
that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel because
his attorney had failed even to inform him of his right to appeal."2
The court in ruling against White rested its decision in part upon
the fact that defendant, having recently completed a substantial
prison sentence could not have been unaware of his right to appeal. Counsel for the defendant testified that he had assumed a
prisoner as experienced as White would be aware of his right to
appeal.

83

Simmons, a case in which the defendant retained an attorney
specifically for the purpose of appeal seems to be a harsher decision than White. Even though Simmons' counsel rendered virtually no assistance, and even more, led Simmons to believe that
a notice of intent to appeal had in fact been filed, the court read
the Post-Conviction Procedure Act to preclude any relief for Simmons. It should be noted that federal habeas corpus reliefs4 is not
a fully satisfactory remedy for a defendant such as Simmons. He
must first spend several months in his application for state postconviction relief, more time in its appeal, and finally still more
time applying for federal habeas corpus relief. If he by-passes this
laborious process because he assumes, from this decision and
from White, that state post-conviction relief is not available to
him, he risks a federal district court's holding that he has not
diligently pursued all available state remedies."
There are two means by which this problem could be remedied in the state courts. The first would be to enact and implement statutory procedures for advising a convicted defendant at
82. Record at 130.
83. Record at 155.
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970), which states in'pertinent part:
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless
it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts
of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective
process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to
protect the rights of the prisoner.
85. The availability of federal habeas corpus relief to prisoners who have unsuccessfully purused state post-conviction relief now seems to be in jeopardy. Despite the specific
language of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (see note 84 supra), the United States Supreme Court has
held that a state prisoner asserting a Fourth Amendment claim after conviction is not
U.S. -,
96 S.Ct. 3037,
entitled to federal habeas corpus relief. Stone v. Powell, 3052 (1976).
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the time of his sentencing that he has a right to appeal. This
approach has been advised by the American Bar Association Special Committee on Minimum Standards for the Administration
of Criminal Justice. That committee recommends that the states
require the sentencing court by law to advise the defendant of his
right to appeal and of the time limit for commencing that appeal.
Also the sentencing court should afford the defendant the opportunity to give oral notice at that time of his intent to appeal. 6
South Carolina law makes no provision for such a curative procedure.

A second approach would be to liberalize application of the
Uniform Post-Conviction Act to those defendants whose failure
of timely appeal was due to no fault of their own." This approach
has been adopted by leading courts in other jurisdictions. Justice
Traynor of California, while recognizing that, in general, postconviction or habeas corpus relief should not be a substitute for
appeal, nonetheless implies that there may be times when such

relief is justified:
Unless these direct remedies were inadequate for reasons for
which the defendant was not responsible ... we see no basis
for affording him an opportunity to relitigate an alleged violation of such constitutional rights by collateral attack in the state
courts."
86. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standards Relating
to Appellate Review of sentences § 2.2 (Approved Draft 1968) provides:
(a) In all cases where sentence is imposed after a trial on the question of
guilt, review of the sentence should be available on the same basis as review of
the conviction.
(b) In all cases where a sentence is imposed after a guilty plea or the
equivalent, review of the sentence, as well as review of other matters which can
be raised, could appropriately be governed by a procedure patterned after the
following:
(i) Notice of appeal should be required of the defendant within [15]
days of the imposition of sentence. The court should advise the defendant
at the time of sentencing of his right to appeal and of the time limit, and
should at the same time afford him the opportunity to comply orally with
the notice requirement. It should be the responsibility of the attorney who
represented the defendant at the sentencing stage to advise him with
respect to the filing of the notice of appeal; and to assure that his rights
in this respect are protected. Both the sentencing court and the reviewing
court should be authorized to enlarge the time for filing the notice of
appeal for good cause ....

87. This would especially benefit those defendants who had run afoul of § 7-405. See
note 72 supra.
88. In Re Sterling, 63 Cal. 2d 486, 488, 407 P.2d 5, 7, 47 Cal. Rptr. 205, 207 (1965)
(emphasis added).
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The language of the South Carolina act would certainly support
this interpretation, extending relief to one who had not filed a
direct appeal through no fault of his own. At present the case law
has not recognized such a beneficial exception to the Uniform
Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Until such an exception becomes
recognized this collateral attack is not available to a criminal
defendant who has not first pursued a direct appeal.
Richard B. Watson
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